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ABSTRACT This paper provides a test of whether capital structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self‐interest. It is shown that the debt ratio is negatively related to management's shareholding, reflecting the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt ratio. Unless there is a nonmanagerial principal stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can be realized, which may suggest that the existence of large nonmanagerial stockholders might make the interests of managers and public investors coincide.