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第一价格拍卖的简便稳健识别方法AI 解读

This paper proposes a new approach to the identification of first-price auctions that is robust to overbidding, but at the same time remains contiguous with the canonical point-identification approach of Guerre et al. (2000) (GPV) and its simple estimators. We show that a weak identifying restriction allows us to reinterpret the GPV estimates as a bound. We demonstrate that the identifying restriction holds in a set of commonly used auction models that can generate…

一价拍卖中的稳健推断：以过度竞价作为识别限制AI 解读

Laboratory experiments find consistently that bidding in first-price auctions tends to be more aggressive than predicted by the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (RNBNE) — a finding known as the overbidding puzzle. Several alternative models can explain the overbidding puzzle, but no canonical alternative to RNBNE has emerged. Instead of estimating a particular model of overbidding, we use the overbidding restriction itself for identification, which allows us to bound…

存在未观测拍卖异质性时第一价格拍卖风险厌恶的识别与估计AI 解读

This paper shows point-identification in first-price auctions with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity, by exploiting multiple bids per auction and variation in the number of bidders. If the exclusion restriction required for point-identification is violated, the recovered primitives are still valid bounds under weaker restrictions. We propose a Sieve Maximum Likelihood Estimator (SMLE). Monte Carlo experiments illustrate that the estimator performs well and…

第一价格拍卖中模糊性的经验相关性AI 解读

We study the identification and estimation of first-price auctions with independent private values if bidders face ambiguity about the valuation distribution and have maxmin expected utility. Using variation in the number of bidders we nonparametrically identify the true valuation distribution and the lower envelope of the set of prior beliefs. We also allow for CRRA and unobserved auction heterogeneity, and propose a Bayesian estimation method based on Bernstein…