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电子拍卖竞价模型的识别与估计AI 解读

Because of discrete bid increments, bidders at electronic auctions engage in shading instead of revealing their valuations, which would occur under the commonly assumed second-price rule. We demonstrate that misspecifying the pricing rule can lead to biased estimates of the latent valuation distribution, and then explore identification and estimation of a model with a correctly specified pricing rule. A further challenge to econometricians is that only a lower bound on the…

具有信号关联性的第一价格密封投标拍卖模型的半参数估计AI 解读

Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members—the Clayton, Frank, and…

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多单位序贯时钟拍卖的实证模型AI 解读

Abstract We construct a model of participation and bidding at multi‐unit, sequential, clock auctions when bidders have multi‐unit demand. We describe conditions sufficient to characterize a symmetric, perfect‐Bayesian equilibrium and then demonstrate that this equilibrium induces an efficient allocation. We propose an algorithm, based on the generalized Vickrey auction, to calculate the expected winning bid for each unit sold. This algorithm allows us to construct a…

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租金最大化的随机含义：不列颠哥伦比亚木材立木费率的应用AI 解读

Abstract We construct a model of rent‐maximizing behaviour by a single seller of timber in the absence of a formal market, deriving the stochastic implications of rent maximization for timber prices (stumpage rates) when other input and output (lumber) prices are random. Subsequently, we examine the model's ability to describe monthly, time‐series, stumpage‐rate data from British Columbia, Canada between January 1979 and October 1999. Deviations of stumpage rates from their…

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独立私人价值范式下参数化拍卖实证模型的识别、估计与检验AI 解读

Recent advances in the application of game theory to the study of auctions have spawned a growing empirical literature involving both experimental and field data. In this paper, we focus on four different mechanisms (the Dutch, English, first-price sealed-bid, and Vickrey auctions) within one of the most commonly used theoretical models (the independent private values paradigm) to investigate issues of identification, estimation, and testing in parametric structural…

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