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成本与风险厌恶不对称下的采购竞标AI 解读

We propose an empirical method to analyze data from first-price procurements where bidders are asymmetric in their risk-aversion (CRRA) coefficients and distributions of private costs. Our Bayesian approach evaluates the likelihood by solving type-symmetric equilibria using the boundary-value method and integrates out unobserved heterogeneity through data augmentation. We study a new dataset from Russian government procurements focusing on the category of printing papers. We…

第一价格拍卖中模糊性的经验相关性AI 解读

We study the identification and estimation of first-price auctions with independent private values if bidders face ambiguity about the valuation distribution and have maxmin expected utility. Using variation in the number of bidders we nonparametrically identify the true valuation distribution and the lower envelope of the set of prior beliefs. We also allow for CRRA and unobserved auction heterogeneity, and propose a Bayesian estimation method based on Bernstein…

利用模拟似然灵活开展第一价格拍卖的贝叶斯分析AI 解读

I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first-price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of Beresteanu (2007). This flexible method is, therefore, fully compatible with the underlying economic theory. To handle such a rich specification, I use a simulated likelihood, yet obtain a…

部分识别拍卖模型的单点决策AI 解读

This article proposes a decision-theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models, such as Haile and Tamer (2003 Haile, P. A. and Tamer, E. 2003. “Inference With an Incomplete Model of English Auctions,”. Journal of Political Economy, 111: 1–51. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), using data on transaction prices from English auctions. The article employs Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989 Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D. 1989.…