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债权人权利是否增加就业风险？来自贷款契约的证据AI 解读

ABSTRACT Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor…

分心的董事：董事会事务繁忙是否损害股东价值？AI 解读

We use the deaths of directors and chief executive officers as a natural experiment to generate exogenous variation in the time and resources available to independent directors at interlocked firms. The loss of such key co-employees is an attention shock because it increases the board committee workload only for some interlocked directors—the ‘treatment group’. There is a negative stock market reaction to attention shocks only for treated director-interlocked firms.…