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相互依赖的首次到达时间AI 解读

This paper studies interdependent durations as equilibrium outcomes of a synchronization game, a continuous-time stopping game in which the incentive to stop increases when other players stop. We allow the payoffs to vary with both common shocks and observed and unobserved agent characteristics. The common shocks follow a spectrally negative Lévy process, a semiparametric process that includes Brownian motion as a special case but may also have jumps. We show that…

动态离散选择模型中当下偏误贴现函数的识别AI 解读

We study the identification of dynamic discrete choice models with sophisticated, quasi-hyperbolic time preferences under exclusion restrictions. We consider both standard finite horizon problems and empirically useful infinite horizon ones, which we prove to always have solutions. We reduce identification to finding the present-bias and standard discount factors that solve a system of polynomial equations with coefficients determined by the data and use this to bound the…