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分类依据与纠错

AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要研究价格实验中的需求梯度识别,并明确将偏差归因于跨期干扰,分别对应因果推断及网络与干扰中的干扰问题。

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代码、数据与补充材料

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关注这篇论文的作者
Yifan Wu
Ramesh Johari
Vasilis Syrgkanis

前瞻性需求下的交替价格实验

研究问题
消费者预期未来降价并推迟购买时,交替价格实验能否识别参考价格处的需求梯度,跨期干扰又会造成何种偏差?
方法与思路
作者建立前瞻性消费者、时变估值和无限供给的单产品模型,分析两价位实验的识别局限,并构造三价位实验估计器。
材料陈述的贡献
摘要称,模型中两价位实验即使无限延长且折扣趋零也无法恢复真实梯度;三价位设计则可消除策略等待偏差并渐近恢复。
阅读关注点
应核对不可能性结论对应的模型与信息范围、消费者折现和估值过程要求,以及三价位分配规则与渐近识别条件。
阅读边界
这是 arXiv 预印本,同行评审或期刊接收未经核实。结论针对摘要描述的模型,不能直接推广至有限库存或其他实验环境。

原文摘要

We consider a retailer running a switchback experiment for the price of a single product, with infinite supply. In each period, the seller chooses a price $p$ from a set of predefined prices that consist of a reference price and a few discounted price levels. The goal is to estimate the demand gradient at the reference price point, with the goal of adjusting the reference price to improve revenue after the experiment. In our model, in each period, a unit mass of buyers arrives on the market, with values distributed based on a time-varying process. Crucially, buyers are forward looking with a discounted utility and will choose to not purchase now if they expect to face a discounted price in the near future. We show that forward-looking demand introduces bias in naive estimators of the demand gradient, due to intertemporal interference. Furthermore, we prove that there is no estimator that uses data from price experiments with only two price points that can recover the correct demand gradient, even in the limit of an infinitely long experiment with an infinitesimal price discount. Moreover, we characterize the form of the bias of naive estimators. Finally, we show that with a simple three price level experiment, the seller can remove the bias due to strategic forward-looking behavior and construct an estimator for the demand gradient that asymptotically recovers the truth.

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