Imperfect Competition in a Multi-Security Market with Risk Neutrality
风险中性多证券市场中的不完全竞争AI 解读 ↓
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AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要直接分析多证券市场中私人信息、订单流与均衡价格之间的关系,最明确对应资产定价中的市场微观结构问题。
风险中性多证券市场中的不完全竞争AI 解读 ↓
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THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to develop a model of insider trading (i.e., trading based on private information) in the context of an imperfectly competitive multi-security market with risk-neutral agents. Imperfect competition allows us to consider strategic behavior, and a multi-security market lets us study the effect of a correlated environment on equilibrium. We employ the informational assumption that market makers can observe all order flows, and so portfolio diversification arises in this model for strategic reasons. Given correlated fundamentals, market makers can potentially learn about every security from each order flow. This causes even a risk neutral trader who does not face short-selling restrictions to refrain from determining the demand for each security independently. This contrasts with traditional multi-asset models, which focus on the incentive to reduce portfolio variance, or the effect of short-selling restrictions or budget constraints. Under imperfect competition, correlation has two effects. One, ceteris paribus, it allows the uninformed to learn from additional variables since each order flow could potentially have information about all payoffs. On the other hand, it creates an incentive for informed traders to restrict what others can learn from public information. Thus, our analysis can be viewed as an application to the multi-security, heterogeneous-information model in Admati (1985) of the imperfectly competitive equilibrium concept which Kyle (1985) first applied to the single-security, homogeneous-information model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Our principal results include an explicit characterization of a linear equilibrium as a function of three general covariance matrices associated with payoffs, noise trading, and errors in private signals. Under general covariance structures, we show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the relationship between the vector of prices and the vector of order flows is governed by a symmetric positive definite matrix. The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. We derive the equilibrium in Section 3, and Section 4 comments on the properties of the equilibrium. The proofs of the results are in the Appendix.