Private Insurance, Selection, and Health Care Use
私人保险、自选择与医疗服务使用AI 解读 ↓
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私人保险、自选择与医疗服务使用AI 解读 ↓
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Observed differences in medical utilization between the privately insured and uninsured reflect the combined effects of self-selection and insurance incentives (moral hazard). This article provides a Bayesian framework for decomposing the disparity into incentive and selection components. The effect of self-selection in private insurance on the number of doctor visits is estimated using a multiyear sample of the U.S. adult non-Medicare population obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. We use a flexible econometric framework based on the “Roy model” and develop a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. We estimate the distribution of treatment effects and find strong evidence indicating selection, which accounts, on average, for 50% or more of the observed disparity in doctor visits.