A Note on Birnbaum's Theory of the Likelihood Principle
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The principles of sufficiency and conditionality are shown by Birnbaum [1] to imply the principle of likelihood. But in his formulation it is necessary to adopt in the continuous case, a definition of sufficiency which differs from the conventional definition. The objections against the new definition are set out and it is shown that the conventional definition can be adhered to by taking into consideration that in practice there is always a finite limit to the accuracy with which the values assumed by a continuous random variable can be observed.