Integrated-Quantile-Based Estimation for First-Price Auction Models
基于积分分位数的第一价格拍卖模型估计AI 解读 ↓
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AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要通过拍卖一阶条件恢复潜在估值,属于结构估计;核心对象与方法是估值分位数函数及积分分位数表示,亦对应分位数方法。
基于积分分位数的第一价格拍卖模型估计AI 解读 ↓
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This article considers nonparametric estimation of first-price auction models under the monotonicity restriction on the bidding strategy. Based on an integrated-quantile representation of the first-order condition, we propose a tuning-parameter-free estimator for the valuation quantile function. We establish its cube-root-n consistency and asymptotic distribution under weaker smoothness assumptions than those typically assumed in the empirical literature. If the latter are true, we also provide a trimming-free smoothed estimator and show that it is asymptotically normal and achieves the optimal rate of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). We illustrate our method using Monte Carlo simulations and an empirical study of the California highway procurement auctions. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.
利用成交价格进行有限样本拍卖推断
We first provide inference on the quantile function of the bid distribution in firstprice or descending auctions, and the quantile function of the value distribution in second-price or ascending auctions, with a known number of bidders with symmetric independent private values. Specifically, we provide finite-sample, nonparametric, tuning parameter-free, uniform confidence bands for these quantile functions when observing only the transaction price. We also show how these…
一般处理模型的高阶去偏估计量
We have witnessed tremendous progress in developing the foundation for econometrics and causal inference in the past decades. The most popular paradigm is the classical (first-order) semiparametric theory, in which a key building block is the (first-order) influence function. However, it is well known that estimators based on influence functions can be sub-optimal in various settings. To address this issue, higher-order influence functions (HOIF) are developed. However, most…
一般处理模型中的高阶去偏估计器
It is now well known that estimators based on influence functions can be sub-optimal in terms of convergence rates in various settings. To address this issue, higher-order influence functions (HOIF) are developed, generalizing the classical semiparametric theory. However, most existing results in this regard focus on treatment effect parameters defined in explicit forms, such as average treatment effects (ATE). In applications, economists are often confronted with tasks of…
序贯英式拍卖中估值分布的部分识别
This paper extends the incomplete model of Haile and Tamer (2003) from static English auctions to sequential English auctions. Because bidders may wait for future opportunities, the static condition that bidders do not let rivals win at beatable prices need not hold. We replace it with a dynamic opportunity-cost restriction, yielding nonparametric valuation bounds without solving a dynamic equilibrium. Sharp bounds are also characterized. We propose a novel moment-condition…
斯勒茨基对称性的非参数可检验性
Economic theory implies strong limitations on what types of consumption behavior are considered rational. Rationality implies that the Slutsky matrix, which captures the substitution effects of compensated price changes on demand for different goods, is symmetric and negative semi-definite. While empirically informed versions of negative semi-definiteness have been shown to be nonparametrically testable, the analogous question for Slutsky symmetry has remained open.…
第一价格拍卖反事实的非参数推断
In a classical model of the first-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values, we develop nonparametric estimators for several policy-relevant targets, such as the bidder's surplus and auctioneer's revenue under counterfactual reserve prices. Motivated by the linearity of these targets in the quantile function of bidders' values, we propose an estimator of the latter and derive its Bahadur-Kiefer expansion. This makes it possible to construct uniform confidence…