A Bayesian Indifference Procedure

原文摘要

In a logical probability approach to inference, distributions on a parameter space are interpretable as representing states of knowledge, and any prevailing state of knowledge may be taken to have been arrived at from a previous state of ignorance (indifference) followed by an accumulation of prior data. In this paper an indifference procedure is introduced that requires postulating what size and what kind of samples will and will not (in a special sense) permit statistical inference and prediction—e.g., one observation from a two-parameter normal model is not (in our special sense) sufficient to permit inference about the variance but two observations are. In essence, the procedure stipulates that prior indifference distributions be improper but become proper after an appropriate minimal sample. With some limitation on the family of priors considered, this procedure permits unique specification of indifference for the more commonly encountered statistical models. Furthermore, these specifications are affected neither by change of the scale of measurement of the observations, nor by the sampling rule.

摘要来源：OpenAlex 索引摘要（稿件版本未注明）