Dynamic Spatial Interaction Models for a Resource Allocator's Decisions and Local Agents' Multiple Activities
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资源配置者决策与地方主体多项活动的动态空间互动模型
- 研究问题
- 资源配置者如何根据地方主体间的外部性分配资源，地方主体的多项活动又如何相互影响，并共同决定支出及社会福利？
- 方法与思路
- 作者建立包含资源配置者与多活动地方主体的网络博弈，以唯一纳什均衡构造计量模型，并用准最大似然估计收益参数。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要报告美国州政府两类支出间存在显著溢出，联邦拨款对两者有正向作用；模型反事实显示响应式干预的福利改善相对有限。
- 阅读关注点
- 应核对均衡唯一性的条件、资源分配与支出的同时决定如何识别、空间权重设定及 QML 渐近条件，并审查福利反事实的依据。
- 阅读边界
- 这是 arXiv 预印本，同行评审及期刊接收未核实。摘要未给出识别条件、效应量或福利公式，政策比较依赖尚未核对的模型设定。
原文摘要
This paper introduces a novel spatial interaction model to explore the decision-making processes of a resource allocator and local agents, with central and local governments serving as empirical representations. The model captures two key features: (i) resource allocations from the allocator to local agents and the resulting strategic interactions, and (ii) local agents' multiple activities and their interactions. We develop a network game for the micro-foundations of these processes. In this game, local agents engage in multiple activities, while the allocator distributes resources by monitoring the externalities arising from their interactions. The game's unique Nash equilibrium establishes our econometric framework. To estimate the agent payoff parameters, we employ the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimation method and examine the asymptotic properties of the QML estimator to ensure robust statistical inference. Empirically, we study interactions among U.S. states in public welfare and housing and community development expenditures, focusing on how federal grants influence these expenditures and the interdependencies among state governments. Our findings reveal significant spillovers across the states' two expenditures. Additionally, we detect positive effects of federal grants on both types of expenditures, inducing a responsive grant scheme based on states' decisions. Last, we compare state expenditures and social welfare through counterfactual simulations under two scenarios: (i) responsive intervention by monitoring states' decisions and (ii) autonomous transfers. We find that responsive intervention enhances social welfare by leading to an increase in the states' two expenditures. However, due to the heavy reliance on autonomous transfers, the magnitude of these improvements remains relatively small compared to the share of federal grants in total state revenues.