Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians
医生的劳动供给、服务强度与薪酬合同：理论与证据AI 解读 ↓
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分类依据与纠错
AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类：摘要明确说明结构离散选择模型，并使用相连接的行政与调查面板数据估计医生的合同选择和劳动供给。
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医生的劳动供给、服务强度与薪酬合同：理论与证据
- 研究问题
- 按服务收费与混合薪酬合同如何改变医生的工作时间、单位时间服务数量和福利，强制改革的影响是否不同于自愿选择？
- 方法与思路
- 作者结合行政与调查面板数据，估计同时包含服务强度、合同选择和劳动供给的结构离散选择模型，并进行事前反事实预测。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要称混合薪酬降低服务供给，而接诊时间反应较弱；强制采用混合薪酬及纯日薪改革的预测行为变化不同于已观察改革。
- 阅读关注点
- 应核对偏好和约束设定、合同选择的识别、服务强度测量，以及等价变差计算和强制改革反事实所依赖的模型外推。
- 阅读边界
- 仅据所给 Crossref 摘要；模型假设、识别条件和不确定性未说明，福利及改革预测需依赖全文中的结构设定加以判断。
原文摘要
Summary Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyse the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee‐for‐service contract or a mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, physicians received a per diem and a reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates of a structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided per hour) and contract choice into a labour supply framework. We use our estimates to predict (ex ante) the effects of contracts on physician behaviour and welfare, as measured by average equivalent variations. The supply of services is reduced under an MR contract, suggesting incentives matter. Hours spent seeing patients is less sensitive to incentives than the supply of services. Our results suggest that a reform forcing all physicians to adopt the MR system would have substantially larger effects on physician behaviour than were measured under the observed reform. A pure salary (per diem) reform would sharply reduce services but would increase time spent seeing patients.