An Experimental Evaluation of Deferred Acceptance: Evidence From Over 100 Army Officer Labor Markets
延迟接受算法的实验评估：来自逾百个军官劳动力市场的证据AI 解读 ↓
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延迟接受算法的实验评估：来自逾百个军官劳动力市场的证据
- 研究问题
- 在组织内部劳动力市场中，延迟接受算法相对管理者主导匹配能否改善匹配质量与后续表现，策略协调如何影响效果？
- 方法与思路
- 作者在美国陆军内部市场进行随机试验，比较两种匹配机制，评价行政负担、偏好报告、匹配质量及两年后的留任表现。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要称算法改善匹配质量并减轻行政负担，但总体留任与绩效收益受策略协调限制；经验较少管理者的市场收益更明显。
- 阅读关注点
- 应核对随机化单位、市场间交流与干扰、匹配质量指标，以及管理者经验异质性和策略协调机制的证据来源。
- 阅读边界
- 摘要未报告效应大小、随机化细节或多重检验处理；总体影响有限不等于效应为零，异质性和机制解释也需核验。
原文摘要
Internal labor markets are increasingly important for matching workers to jobs within organizations. We present evidence from a randomized trial that compares matching workers to jobs using the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm to the traditional manager‐directed matching process. Our setting is the U.S. Army's internal labor market, which matches over 14,000 officers to units annually. We find that DA reduces administrative burden and increases match quality as measured by reduced justified envy, increased truthful preference reporting, and officers' and units' preferences over their matches. The overall impact of DA on officer retention and performance in the two years after officers started their new jobs is limited by strategic preference coordination between officers and units. However, DA leads to significant improvements in officer retention and promotions in markets with inexperienced managers. Our findings suggest that cross‐market communication between agents in internal labor markets can attenuate the benefits of strategyproof matching algorithms.