Empirical Global Games of Regime Change
政权更替的实证全局博弈模型AI 解读 ↓
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政权更替的实证全局博弈模型
- 研究问题
- 如何在政变的实证分析中显式纳入战略协调，并区分推翻政权的可行性、参与者感知收益与信息不确定性？
- 方法与思路
- 作者构建可估计的全局博弈模型，以其选择均衡，将政权强度与反叛收益分别建模，并结合收缩映射实施模拟极大似然。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要称在维持排除限制与均衡假设下，可将政变结果分解为可行性和意愿成分；有政变力量信息时还可估计强度不确定性。
- 阅读关注点
- 应核对排除限制与均衡选择如何支撑分解、协变量分别进入哪些机制，以及模拟似然和反事实计算的识别依据。
- 阅读边界
- 这是 arXiv 预印本，不能据此认定已同行评审或期刊接收；摘要未列出具体排除限制，也未报告估计或反事实数值。
原文摘要
Global games theory provides a tractable framework for analyzing coordination problems with multiple equilibria, with regime overthrow serving as a canonical application. A large empirical literature on coups d'état examines the relationship between country-level characteristics, coup occurrence, and coup success using reduced-form approaches that leave the underlying coordination problem implicit. Bridging these literatures, we develop an estimable global games model of coups d'état. The model incorporates strategic coordination into the empirical analysis of coups, employing the global games framework as an equilibrium selection device. The model distinguishes between the feasibility and desirability of regime overthrow, allowing observable fundamentals to enter separately into beliefs about regime strength and perceived gains from rebellion. The model therefore provides a theoretical basis for decomposing coup outcomes into feasibility and desirability components under maintained exclusion restrictions and equilibrium assumptions. If information on coup strength is available, the model also allows estimation of agents' uncertainty about regime strength. We show how the model can be estimated using simulated maximum likelihood coupled with a contraction mapping, and demonstrate how observable covariates map into regime strength and the perceived benefits of overthrow. We illustrate how the framework can be applied through counterfactuals varying coup benefits, regime strength, and information quality.