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分类依据与纠错

AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要围绕拍卖结构中的私人估值、竞标利润和配置效率构造可估计界限。

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存在不可观测异质性时的拍卖界限

研究问题
在对称独立私人价值的一价密封拍卖中,忽略拍卖间不可观测异质性,能否仍对利润和配置效率损失获得有效界限?
方法与思路
作者从忽略异质性的拍卖模型推导估值期望相关量的界限,研究仅观察获胜出价时的估计,并应用于公路采购拍卖。
材料陈述的贡献
摘要称,若干经济量可在较一般条件下获得界限;仅观察获胜出价时,收敛速度可能慢于平方根速度且取决于竞标人数。
阅读关注点
应核对不可观测异质性的具体限制、界限方向与紧致性,以及只观察获胜出价时竞标人数如何影响估计速度和推断。
阅读边界
仅依据所给 OpenAlex 版本摘要;所谓较一般条件未展开,不能将界限结论推广至非对称拍卖、相关私人价值或其他拍卖机制。

原文摘要

Many empirical studies of auctions rely on the assumption that the researcher observes all variables that make auctions differ ex ante. When there is unobserved heterogeneity, the direction of the bias this causes is known only in a few restrictive examples. In this paper, I show that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in a first price sealed bid auction with symmetric independent private values gives bounds on several quantities of economic interest under surprisingly general conditions. The results apply to certain quantities related to expectations of valuations, including bidder profits (which can be used to recover bid preparation costs in entry models) and the efficiency loss of assigning the object randomly. I then turn to estimation of these bounds, and show that, when only the winning bid is available, the rate of convergence can be slower than the square root of the number of auctions observed and depends on the number of bidders. These results apply more generally to estimation of functionals of a distribution from repeated observations of an order statistic and may be of independent interest. I apply these methods to bound the efficiency loss from replacing a set of procurement auctions for highway construction in Michigan with random assignment.

笔记与分组
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