Panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections
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生产函数与产品、劳动市场不完全性的面板估计
- 研究问题
- 产品和劳动市场的不完全竞争如何共同造成生产弹性与收入份额之间的楔子，并如何据企业数据区分市场竞争机制？
- 方法与思路
- 作者在有效谈判和买方垄断模型下扩展 Hall 框架，使用法国企业非平衡面板分类行业，并以 Swamy 方法评估企业差异。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要称，可用联合市场不完全性参数刻画楔子，并识别六类市场机制；所述样本中产品不完全竞争与有效谈判组合最常见。
- 阅读关注点
- 应核对生产函数与市场参数的识别、投入内生性的处理、机制分类规则，以及如何分离真实企业异质性和估计噪声。
- 阅读边界
- 仅依据所给 Crossref 摘要；估计方程、识别条件和分类不确定性未说明，行业机制判断不能脱离模型直接视为市场事实。
原文摘要
SUMMARY Consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market—the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model—we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of Hall's framework for estimating price‐cost margins. We show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue, which can be characterized by a ‘joint market imperfections parameter’. Using an unbalanced panel of 10,646 French firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978–2001, we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market. By far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market (IC‐EB), followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right‐to‐manage bargaining in the labor market (IC‐PR), and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market (PC‐MO). For each of these three predominant regimes, we assess within‐regime firm differences in the estimated average price‐cost mark‐up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters, following the Swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion. To assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime (IC‐EB), we also relate our industry and firm‐level estimates of price‐cost mark‐up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm‐specific variables respectively. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.