Environmental Policy and Firm Performance in Europe: A Difference-in-Differences Approach with Spillovers
欧洲环境政策与企业表现：考虑溢出的双重差分方法AI 解读 ↓
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欧洲环境政策与企业表现：考虑溢出的双重差分方法
- 研究问题
- 欧盟排放交易体系如何影响企业排放，交易联系产生的间接溢出是否会改变仅观察受监管企业所得的政策效果判断？
- 方法与思路
- 作者提出允许处理单位间干扰的双重差分方法，区分直接与交易溢出效应，并匹配2001—2017年欧洲工业设施排放数据。
- 材料陈述的贡献
- 摘要称估计方法在模拟中表现良好；应用发现减排集中于非交易设施，而计入交易设施溢出后，这部分减排被完全抵消。
- 阅读关注点
- 核对交易联系与溢出暴露的定义、直接和间接效应识别条件，并检查设施匹配质量、趋势比较及总效应的汇总方式。
- 阅读边界
- 这是arXiv预印本，同行评审或期刊接收未核实；摘要未列出识别假设、效应数值及稳健性检验，政策结论须结合全文判断。
原文摘要
In this paper we investigate the causal impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System, a cap-and-trade scheme limiting greenhouse gas emissions of firms, on their environmental performance. Although previous studies have focused primarily on the effect of the emission cap imposed by the policy, we argue that the trading mechanism creates complex interdependencies among firms that can change the policy's intended effects. We develop a novel Difference-in-Differences approach that disentangles the direct causal effects of the scheme on regulated firms from the indirect spillover effects arising from trading among firms. By incorporating potential interference between treated units, our methodology allows a more comprehensive assessment of the policy's overall effectiveness. Monte Carlo simulations show that our proposed estimators perform well in finite samples, confirming the reliability of our approach. To assess the direct and indirect effects of the scheme, we construct a novel database on emissions of European industrial sites by matching information on treated plants from the European Commission's Community Independent Transaction Log with emission data from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register for the years from 2001 to 2017. We find that the scheme reduced emissions only for non-trading plants, but such reduction is entirely offset when accounting for spillovers from trading plants, thus suggesting that the trading mechanism neutralizes the environmental benefits of the policy. Our findings have important implications for the design of future environmental policies and the ongoing evaluation of cap and trade policies.