Identification and Estimation in Many‐to‐One Two‐Sided Matching Without Transfers
无转移支付多对一双边匹配的识别与估计AI 解读 ↓
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无转移支付多对一双边匹配的识别与估计AI 解读 ↓
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In a setting of many‐to‐one two‐sided matching with nontransferable utilities, for example, college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions. To take our results to the data, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate different estimators, including the ones that are directly constructed from the identification. We find that a parametric Bayesian approach with a Gibbs sampler works well in realistically sized problems. Finally, we illustrate our methodology in decentralized admissions to public and private schools in Chile and conduct a counterfactual analysis of an affirmative action policy.
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动态离散选择模型的半参数贝叶斯估计
We propose a tractable semiparametric estimation method for structural dynamic discrete choice models. The distribution of additive utility shocks in the proposed framework is modeled by location-scale mixtures of extreme value distributions with varying numbers of mixture components. Our approach exploits the analytical tractability of extreme value distributions in the multinomial choice settings and the flexibility of the location-scale mixtures. We implement the Bayesian…
无转移支付的多对一双边匹配:识别与估计
In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with non-transferable utilities, e.g., college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions. To take our results to the data, we use Monte Carlo…