Estimating Discrete Games of Complete Information: Bringing Logit Back in the Game
完全信息离散博弈的估计:让 Logit 重回博弈AI 解读 ↓
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完全信息离散博弈的估计:让 Logit 重回博弈AI 解读 ↓
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Discrete games are central tools for empirical analysis of strategic interaction, but equilibrium multiplicity and partial identification often make them computationally difficult to estimate. This paper develops tractable methods for estimation and inference in complete-information discrete games. The key idea is to construct an outer set by comparing observed frequencies of action profiles with singleton-class generalized likelihoods: model-implied probabilities that those profiles can arise as equilibria. The resulting conditional moment inequalities avoid computationally expensive equilibrium enumeration, numerical simulation, and grid search. Under standard empirical assumptions used in discrete-game models, including logit payoff shocks, these restrictions have closed-form expressions and are convex in a subvector of structural parameters. I develop the approach for both unordered and ordered action spaces. Monte Carlo experiments and empirical applications show that the methods deliver informative outer sets and can reduce computation time by several orders of magnitude relative to existing approaches.
熵正则化最优传输下的部分识别
In many statistical settings, the available data and maintained assumptions do not suffice to uniquely identify the model parameters of interest. In such cases, one can only identify sets which are guaranteed to contain the true parameters. These are often characterized through linear programs that optimize over models compatible with the observed data. These programs can be infinite-dimensional in the optimizer and the number of constraints. We provide a unified way to…
动态离散选择模型的半参数贝叶斯估计
We propose a tractable semiparametric estimation method for structural dynamic discrete choice models. The distribution of additive utility shocks in the proposed framework is modeled by location-scale mixtures of extreme value distributions with varying numbers of mixture components. Our approach exploits the analytical tractability of extreme value distributions in the multinomial choice settings and the flexibility of the location-scale mixtures. We implement the Bayesian…
动态离散选择模型的半参数贝叶斯估计
We propose a tractable semiparametric estimation method for structural dynamic discrete choice models. The distribution of additive utility shocks in the proposed framework is modeled by location-scale mixtures of extreme value distributions with varying numbers of mixture components. Our approach exploits the analytical tractability of extreme value distributions in the multinomial choice settings and the flexibility of the location-scale mixtures. We implement the Bayesian…
替代与互补关系模式的检验和识别
This paper studies semiparametric identification of substitution and complementarity patterns between two goods using a panel multinomial choice model with bundles. The model allows the two goods to be either substitutes or complements and admits heterogeneous complementarity through observed characteristics. I first provide testable implications for the complementarity relationship between goods. I then characterize the sharp identified set for the model parameters and…
不施加均衡限制的博弈推断:餐厅营业时间竞争应用
This article relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium assumption in the estimation of discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming unbiased/correct expectations, the model specifies a player’s belief about the behaviors of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I then study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions in a game where players have different numbers of actions (e.g., 3 × 2 game). This asymmetry in action sets…
完全信息有序反应博弈中的推断
We study inference in complete information games with discrete strategy spaces. Unlike binary games, we allow for rich strategy spaces and we only assume that they are ordinal in nature. We derive observable implications of equilibrium play under mild shape restrictions on payoff functions, and we characterize sharp identified sets for model parameters. We propose a novel inference method based on a test statistic that embeds conditional moment inequalities implied by…