Identifying contagion
识别金融传染AI 解读 ↓
本页整理公开书目信息,不生成学术质量评分。AI 解读根据题名及所注明的摘要或原文片段生成,未完成全文核验,可能有误;具体假设、证明与结论请核对原文。摘要保留来源文本,未经模型改写。
DOI 首次登记不等于接收或发表日期。部分更正、评论等条目没有独立摘要;缺少可靠材料时保留待补状态。
引用量采用 OpenAlex 单条关联记录,不合计多个记录;关联记录可能包含正式发表版本,不等于此版本单独引用。缺失不视为零,引用指标不代表论文质量。
关注作者按书目中的完整姓名匹配,同名和姓名变体需人工辨别。相关论文先按共享细分方向和具体方法排列,再参考通用方法与发表日期。
AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要将金融危机中的传染和系统性风险与共同因子、GARCH 波动率联系起来,直接对应风险、金融因子及波动率。
识别金融传染AI 解读 ↓
正在核对关联版本…
正在核对对应版本的资源…
Summary Identifying contagion effects during periods of financial crisis is known to be complicated by the changing volatility of asset returns during periods of stress. To untangle this we propose a GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) common features approach, where systemic risk emerges from a common factor source (or indeed multiple factor sources) with contagion evident through possible changes in the factor loadings relating to the common factor(s). Within a portfolio mimicking factor framework this can be identified using moment conditions. We use this framework to identify contagion in three illustrations involving both single and multiple factor specifications: to the Asian currency markets in 1997–1998, to US sectoral equity indices in 2007–2009 and to the CDS (credit default swap) market during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2013. The results reveal the extent to which contagion effects may be masked by not accounting for the sources of changed volatility apparent in simple measures such as correlation.