Bayesian Graphs of Intelligent Causation
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Probabilistic Graphical Bayesian models of causation have continued to impact on strategic analyses designed to help evaluate the efficacy of different interventions on systems. However, the standard causal algebras upon which these inferences are based typically assume that the intervened population does not react intelligently to frustrate an intervention. In an adversarial setting this is rarely an appropriate assumption. In this paper, we extend an established Bayesian methodology called Adversarial Risk Analysis to apply it to settings that can legitimately be designated as causal in this graphical sense. To embed this technology we first need to generalize the concept of a causal graph. We then proceed to demonstrate how the predicable intelligent reactions of adversaries to circumvent an intervention when they hear about it can be systematically modelled within such graphical frameworks, importing these recent developments from Bayesian game theory. The new methodologies and supporting protocols are illustrated through applications associated with an adversary attempting to infiltrate a friendly state.