Estimation of finite sequential games
有限序贯博弈的估计AI 解读 ↓
本页整理公开书目信息,不生成学术质量评分。AI 解读根据题名及所注明的摘要或原文片段生成,未完成全文核验,可能有误;具体假设、证明与结论请核对原文。摘要保留来源文本,未经模型改写。
DOI 首次登记不等于接收或发表日期。部分更正、评论等条目没有独立摘要;缺少可靠材料时保留待补状态。
引用量采用 OpenAlex 单条关联记录,不合计多个记录;关联记录可能包含正式发表版本,不等于此版本单独引用。缺失不视为零,引用指标不代表论文质量。
关注作者按书目中的完整姓名匹配,同名和姓名变体需人工辨别。相关论文先按共享细分方向和具体方法排列,再参考通用方法与发表日期。
AI 根据所提供的论文材料归类:摘要围绕有限序贯博弈、子博弈精炼均衡及结果似然开展估计,直接对应战略互动模型的结构估计。
有限序贯博弈的估计AI 解读 ↓
正在核对关联版本…
正在核对对应版本的资源…
I propose a new estimation method for finite sequential games that is efficient, computationally attractive, and applicable to a fairly general class of finite sequential games that is beyond the scope of existing studies. The major challenge is the computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. This complication resolves when unobserved off-the-equilibrium-path strategies are controlled for. Separately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each subgame-perfect equilibrium that generates the observed outcome allows the use of the GHK simulator, a widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method.