跳到正文
← 返回论文列表与筛选
阅读说明

本页整理公开书目信息,不生成学术质量评分。AI 解读根据题名及所注明的摘要或原文片段生成,未完成全文核验,可能有误;具体假设、证明与结论请核对原文。摘要保留来源文本,未经模型改写。

DOI 首次登记不等于接收或发表日期。部分更正、评论等条目没有独立摘要;缺少可靠材料时保留待补状态。

引用量采用 OpenAlex 单条关联记录,不合计多个记录;关联记录可能包含正式发表版本,不等于此版本单独引用。缺失不视为零,引用指标不代表论文质量。

关注作者按书目中的完整姓名匹配,同名和姓名变体需人工辨别。相关论文先按共享细分方向和具体方法排列,再参考通用方法与发表日期。

分类依据与纠错

分类依据题名和摘要中的方法词与领域语境,不使用期刊名称猜测研究方向。

反馈分类问题

正在核对关联版本…

代码、数据与补充材料

正在核对对应版本的资源…

关注这篇论文的作者
Jonas Jessen
Robin Jessen
Marek Góra
Jochen Kluve

原文摘要

Abstract We quantify micro and macro effects of changes in the potential benefit duration (PBD) in unemployment insurance. In Poland, the PBD is 12 months for the newly unemployed if the previous year’s county unemployment rate is more than 150% of the national average, and 6 months otherwise. We exploit this cut-off using regression discontinuity estimates on registry data containing the universe of unemployed from 2005 to 2019. For those whose PBD is directly affected by the policy rule, benefit recipients younger than 50, a PBD increase from 6 to 12 months leads to 13% higher unemployment. A decomposition analysis reveals that 12 months after an increase in the PBD, only half of the increase in unemployment is due to the effect on search effort (the micro effect) while the other half is due to increased inflows into unemployment. The total effect on unemployment, which includes equilibrium effects, is entirely explained by the increase in unemployment of workers directly affected by the policy change. We find no evidence of spill-overs on two distinct groups of unemployed whose PBD is unchanged and no effect on measures of labour market tightness.

笔记与分组