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电子拍卖竞价模型的识别与估计AI 解读

Because of discrete bid increments, bidders at electronic auctions engage in shading instead of revealing their valuations, which would occur under the commonly assumed second-price rule. We demonstrate that misspecifying the pricing rule can lead to biased estimates of the latent valuation distribution, and then explore identification and estimation of a model with a correctly specified pricing rule. A further challenge to econometricians is that only a lower bound on the…

Summary Two‐step nonparametric estimators have become standard in empirical auctions. A drawback concerns boundary effects which cause inconsistencies near the endpoints of the support and bias in finite samples. To cope, sample trimming is typically used, which leads to non‐random data loss. Monte Carlo experiments show this leads to poor performance near the support boundaries and on the interior due to bandwidth selection issues. We propose a modification that employs…

具有信号关联性的第一价格密封投标拍卖模型的半参数估计AI 解读

Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members—the Clayton, Frank, and…