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Joint analysis of the discount factor and payoff parameters in dynamic discrete choice models

动态离散选择模型中折扣因子与收益参数的联合分析

Most empirical and theoretical econometric studies of dynamic discrete choice models assume the discount factor to be known. We show the knowledge of the discount factor is not necessary to identify parts, or even all, of the payoff function. We show the discount factor can be generically identified jointly with the payoff parameters. On the other hand, it is known the payoff function cannot be nonparametrically identified without any a priori restrictions. Our…

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Binary choice models with discrete regressors: Identification and misspecification

离散解释变量下二元选择模型的识别与误设

This paper explores the inferential question in semiparametric binary response models when the continuous support condition is not satisfied and all regressors have discrete support. I focus mainly on the models under the conditional median restriction, as in Manski (1985). I find sharp bounds on the components of the parameter of interest and outline several applications. The formulas for bounds obtained using a recursive procedure help analyze cases where one regressor’s…

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A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions

广义竞争风险模型识别的新方法及其二价拍卖应用

This paper proposes an approach to proving nonparametric identification for distributions of bidders' values in asymmetric second-price auctions. I consider the case when bidders have independent private values and the only available data pertain to the winner's identity and the transaction price. My proof of identification is constructive and is based on establishing the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the system of nonlinear differential equations that describes…

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