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Econometrics of insurance with multidimensional types

多维类型保险模型的计量分析

In this paper, we address the identification and estimation of insurance models where insurees have private information about their risk and risk aversion. The model includes random damages and allows for several claims, while insurees choose from a finite number of coverages. We show that the joint distribution of risk and risk aversion is nonparametrically identified despite bunching due to multidimensional types and a finite number of coverages. Our identification…

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Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models

第一价格拍卖模型的半参数估计

In this article, we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure to estimate first-price auction models. In the first step, we estimate the bid density and distribution using local polynomial method, and recover a sample of (pseudo) private values. In the second step, we apply the method of moments to the sample of private values to estimate a finite set of parameters that characterize the density of private values. We show that our estimator attains the parametric…

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Estimation of Heterogeneous Individual Treatment Effects With Endogenous Treatments

内生处理下异质性个体处理效应的估计

This article estimates individual treatment effects (ITE) and its probability distribution in a triangular model with binary-valued endogenous treatments. Our estimation procedure takes two steps. First, we estimate the counterfactual outcome and hence, the ITE for every observational unit in the sample. Second, we estimate the ITE density function of the whole population. Our estimation method does not suffer from the ill-posed inverse problem associated with inverting a…

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Structural Analysis of Nonlinear Pricing

This paper proposes a new methodology for analyzing nonlinear pricing data. We establish identification of the model primitives with a known tariff and characterize the model restrictions on observables. We propose a quantile-based nonparametric estimator that achieves consistency at the parametric rate. We introduce unobserved product heterogeneity with an unknown tariff and show how our identification and estimation results extend. A Monte Carlo study analyzes the…

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Rationalization and identification of binary games with correlated types

私人类型相关的二元博弈:模型相容性与识别

This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for type correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated private information and homophily, respectively. Our approach is fully nonparametric in the joint distribution of types and the strategic effects in the payoffs. First, under monotone pure Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategy, we…

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Counterfactual mapping and individual treatment effects in nonseparable models with binary endogeneity

二元内生非可分模型中的反事实映射与个体处理效应

This paper establishes nonparametric identification of individual treatment effects in a nonseparable model with a binary endogenous regressor. The outcome variable may be continuous, discrete, or a mixture of both, while the instrumental variable can take binary values. First, we study the case where the model includes a selection equation for the binary endogenous regressor. We establish point identification of the individual treatment effects and the structural function…

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Efficient estimation in dynamic conditional quantile models

动态条件分位数模型的有效估计

In this paper we consider the problem of semiparametric efficient estimation in conditional quantile models with time series data. We construct an M-estimator which achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound recently derived by Komunjer and Vuong (forthcoming). Our efficient M-estimator is obtained by minimizing an objective function which depends on a nonparametric estimator of the conditional distribution of the variable of interest rather than its density. The estimator…

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SEMIPARAMETRIC EFFICIENCY BOUND IN TIME-SERIES MODELS FOR CONDITIONAL QUANTILES

条件分位数时间序列模型的半参数效率界

We derive the semiparametric efficiency bound in dynamic models of conditional quantiles under a sole strong mixing assumption. We also provide an expression of Stein’s (1956) least favorable parametric submodel. Our approach is as follows: First, we construct a fully parametric submodel of the semiparametric model defined by the conditional quantile restriction that contains the data generating process. We then compare the asymptotic covariance matrix of the MLE obtained in…

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Asymmetry in first‐price auctions with affiliated private values

关联私人价值下第一价格拍卖的非对称性

Abstract Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first‐price auctions with affiliated private values. Considering two types of bidders, we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid…

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Semiparametric Estimation of the Optimal Reserve Price in First-Price Auctions

第一价格拍卖最优保留价的半参数估计

generally expressed as a functional of the latent distribution of private signals, which is by nature unobserved. This feature has limited the implementation of the optimal reserve price in practice. In this article, we consider first-price auctions within the general affiliated private values paradigm. We show that the seller's expected profit can be written as a functional of the observed bid distribution. We propose a semiparametric extremum estimator for estimating…

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Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions

第一价格拍卖中的最优非参数估计

This paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auction data. Considering first-price sealed-bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm, we show that the underlying distribution of bidders' private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions. Using the theory of minimax, we establish the best rate of uniform…

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Auctioning and Bargaining: An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions With Secret Reservation Prices

拍卖与议价:秘密保留价木材拍卖的计量研究

This article considers a first-price sealed-bid auction at which the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance. We allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the Nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round. We characterize the bidders' and seller's Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies. The distributions of the buyers' and seller's private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from auction data on standing…

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Econometrics of First-Price Auctions

一价拍卖的计量经济学

This paper proposes a convenient estimation method for the empirical study of auction models. The authors focus on first-price sealed-bid and descending auctions within the private value paradigm. The method relies upon a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted. Asymptotic properties are established and some extensions are discussed. The method is applied to a market of agricultural products. The structural modeling takes into account the…

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