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Political Parties as Drivers of U.S. Polarization: 1927-2018

政党如何推动美国政治极化:1927—2018

The current polarization of elites in the U.S., particularly in Congress, is frequently ascribed to the emergence of cohorts of ideologically extreme legislators replacing moderate ones.Politicians, however, do not operate as isolated agents, driven solely by their preferences.They act within organized parties, whose leaders exert control over the rank-and-file, directing support for and against policies.This paper shows that the omission of party discipline as a driver of…

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Counterfactual analysis under partial identification using locally robust refinement

部分识别下的反事实分析:局部稳健细化

Summary Structural models that admit multiple reduced forms, such as game‐theoretic models with multiple equilibria, pose challenges in practice, especially when parameters are set identified and the identified set is large. In such cases, researchers often choose to focus on a particular subset of equilibria for counterfactual analysis, but this choice can be hard to justify. This paper shows that some parameter values can be more “desirable” than others for counterfactual…

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Estimating local interactions among many agents who observe their neighbors

观察邻居的众多个体之间的局部互动估计

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information‐sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When any two agents in the network are connected either directly or indirectly in a large network, empirical modeling using an equilibrium approach can be cumbersome, since the testable implications from an equilibrium generally involve all the…

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